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Abstract 
 
This paper formalises feedback trading arising from the popularity of technical analysis. 
It provides a systematic study on the effect of feedback trading on price dynamics. The 
analysis shows under different conditions how prices asymptotically approach the 
fundamental equilibrium and how a significant feedback effect drives them off the 
equilibrium path: prices are observed to exhibit patterns such as momentous 
overshooting and prolonged cycles. Fluctuations off the fundamental equilibrium can 
be systematically and endogenously induced by feedback trading. The results suggest 
that non-fundamental multiple equilibria are possible even though socially undesirable.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the economics and finance literature, the applications of technical analysis have long 
remained controversial. Technical analysis employs historical price information to 
predict future market activity; it includes techniques from simple visual pattern 
recognition, such as head-and-shoulders, to sophisticated neural networks. The ability 
of technical analysis in generating systematic trading profits has been subject to a high 
degree of scepticism by the implications of one important cornerstone in the field of 
financial economics, the efficient market and random walk hypotheses. Previous efforts 
have been made to investigate the performance of technical analysis, but conclusions 
differ1. Although the issue remains unsolved, it is undeniable that technical analysis has 
been widely adopted among institutional and individual traders (Frankel and Froot 
1990; Taylor and Allen 1992). From our perspective, the popularity of technical 
analysis, regardless of its true profitability, will have an impact on markets.  
 
While much of the existing literature seeks to provide analytical solutions or empirical 
evidence concerning the validity of technical analysis as an investment tool, it is only 
until recent years that studies concerning its market impact have started to emerge. On 
the empirical side, the investigation on its market impact has been largely impeded by a 
lack of appropriate data, and perhaps more importantly, by the difficulty in correctly 
identifying the underlying attributes of market phenomena.  
 
On the theoretical side, several efforts have been made. Levy, Levy and Solomon (1994, 
1995) and Levy and Levy (1996) contrasted the market behaviour before and after the 
introduction of heterogeneous expectations in terms of varying spans of price memory, 
and found the latter leads to more realistic price dynamics. Based on this model, Levy 
and Solomon (1996) demonstrate a convergence of the agents’ wealth distribution to a 
power law. In a partial equilibrium setting2, Farmer and Joshi (2000) showed that some 
commonly used trading strategies induce excess volatility.  
                                               
1 In favour of technical analysis, see Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992), Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 
1999), Neftci (1991); against its predictive value, see Dempster and Jones (1999a, 1999b, 2001), 
Goodhart and O’Hara (1997), Sulliven, Timmerman and White (1999). 
 
2 In the authors’ terminology, a ‘market maker’ is included in the model to absorb excess demand or 
supply; unlike a general equilibrium setting, there is no market clearing. 
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Other related work studies the market dynamics arising from the interaction and 
adaptation of heterogeneous agents; these are often referred to as agent-based 
modelling 3  where agents with varying risk attitudes and beliefs switch between 
investment strategies according to trading performance (Brock and Hommes 1997a, 
1997b, 1998; Chiarella 1992; Chiarella and He 2001, 2002; Day and Huang 1990; 
Gaunersdorfer 2000; Hommes 2001, 2002; Lux 1997, 1998; Lux and Marchesi 1999, 
2000). Models with artificial intelligence agents4 also look into their resulting market 
behaviour (Arthur et al. 1997; LeBaron et al. 1999). Research in this area expands 
partly owning to the unsatisfactory assumptions of homogeneous agents and complete 
rationality in conventional models. Many of these studies have successfully connected 
their results with some empirical stylised facts.  
 
In the present paper, we develop independently a simple framework to study the market 
impact of technical analysis. Technical analysis, involving studies of historical data, 
has a feedback effect on prices through trading. We study the feedback effect and how it 
induces systematic price deviations from the fundamental equilibrium, using both 
bifurcation analysis and numerical simulation. A related empirical study is by Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992), who examine the links between volatility and serial correlation 
via the role of feedback trading.  
 
The concern of the present study is related to the work by Farmer and Joshi (2000) but 
with different approaches. One major difference is that, instead of having a market 
maker to absorb excess demand or supply, we conduct the investigation in a general 
equilibrium setting where the market clears in each trading period. Besides, the focuses 
are somehow different in that their analysis on price behaviour is centred at volatility 
issues while we ask whether price dynamics exhibits certain recognisable patterns 
under the impact of technical analysis.   
 
When compared with most computational agent-based models, our model is simple yet 
unrealistically free from agents’ adaptation and interaction. This enables us to 
                                               
 
3 See Hommes (2002) for a recent review. 
4 See LeBaron (2000) for a recent review.  
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investigate the feedback effect on the market in isolation from the complication of 
strategic behavioural issues. The aim here is not to reflect real markets but to answer 
the more fundamental question that arises with the increasing popularity of technical 
analysis.   
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section Two provides a simple asset pricing model 
with myopic mean-variance optimising investors. Section Three discusses the roles of 
heterogeneous conditional expectations. Section Four defines a feedback function that 
has some desirable properties of the average technical forecast. Section Five studies 
price dynamics using bifurcation analysis and generates numerical simulation results. 
Section Six discusses the implications of our finding and concludes.   
 
 
2. A Simple Asset Pricing Model    
 
Consider the following classic portfolio choice problem. Two assets are available to an 
investor at time t. One is risk free and one is risky. The risk free asset pays a fixed rate 
of return fr  for each time period, thus the gross rate of risk free return is ff rR += 1 . 
The risky asset has a gross rate of return 1+tR  from time t to time 1+t . Let ][ 1+tt RE  
and ][ 1+tt RV  denote the conditional mean and conditional variance; they are the mean 
and variance of 1+tR , conditional on the investor’s information at time t. The investor 
places a portfolio weight tw  on the risky asset at time t. The portfolio return is given by  
 tttf
P
t wRwRR 11 )1( ++ +-= .  (1)
  
Investors are assumed to be myopic mean-variance maximisers. That is, investors trade 
off mean and variance in a linear fashion: 
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2
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where a is the risk aversion parameter. The solution to this maximisation problem is  
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This is the well-known result of mean-variance analysis: the optimal portfolio share in 
the risky asset is given by the expected excess rate of return divided by the conditional 
variance times the risk aversion coefficient.  
 
Denote by tP  the price per share of the risky asset at time t. We assume the risky asset 
pays periodic dividends and denote by td  the stochastic dividend process of the risky 
asset. td  is assumed to be an IID process, ( )2,~ dt dIIDd s . The gross risky payoff 
between time t and time 1+t  is given by 11 ++ + tt dP . The gross rate of return on the 
risky asset, 1+tR , is defined as  
 
t
tt
t P
dP
R 111
++
+
+
= ,  (4)
  
and the net rate of return is simply 11 -+tR . Substituting in the definition of 1+tR , the 
portfolio weight on the risky asset at time t, given by (3), can be rewritten as  
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fttttt
t dPVa
RPdPEP
w .  (5) 
 
We assume heterogeneous investors and add superscript i for investor type i. Investors 
differ in their forecasting strategies (or beliefs) on the risky payoff. Let itq  denote the 
fraction of investor type i at time t, representing the popularity of strategy i at time t  
and satisfying å
=
=
N
i
i
t
1
1q , where N is the number of different investor (or strategy) types. 
Let K denote the total size of capital in this two-asset market, and let sx denote the 
supply of risky shares; both are assumed to be constant5. itKq  measures the capital size 
invested in strategy i at time t. Market equilibrium requires  
 st
N
i
i
t
i
t xPwK =å
=1
q .   (6) 
 
Substituting in the portfolio weight (5) with superscript i, and assuming the conditional 
                                               
5 These are simplifying assumptions. In a short time horizon, the total size of market capital and the 
supply of risky shares may be regarded as approximately constant.  
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variance of the risky payoff to be constant6 and equal for all types7, i.e. 211 ][ s=+ ++ tt
i
t dPV , 
the market equilibrium equation can be rewritten as  
 
K
xa
dPEPR
s
tt
i
t
N
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ttf
2
11
1
][
sq -+= ++
=
å .  (7) 
 
Market equilibrium yields the equilibrium price dependent on economic fundamentals 
and also the conditional forecasts influenced by investor psychology and emotion. In 
the next section, we will discuss the formation of heterogeneous investors’ conditional 
forecasts. We now consider a conventional economic world of homogeneous and 
perfectly rational investors. First, equation (7) can be written as  
 
K
xa
PRdPE
s
tfttt
2
11 ][
s=-+ ++ .  (8) 
The term 
K
xa s2s
 measures the expected excess amount of risky payoff and therefore 
may be interpreted as a risk premium.   
 
Solving equation (8) by repeatedly substituting out next period’s prices and assuming 
the transversality (no-bubble) condition 0
)(
][
lim =+
¥® h
f
htt
h R
PE
 holds8, we then obtain 
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The equilibrium price is the discounted sum of future dividends minus the risk 
premium. Equation (9) gives the expression known as the fundamental value of the 
risky asset. Since the dividend process is assumed to be an IID process, we know that 
ddE htt =+ ][ . The fundamental price can be written as  
 ÷÷
ø
ö
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è
æ
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d
r
P
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f
F
21 s .  (10) 
                                               
6 A detailed derivation that solves the conditional variance to a constant value under some distributional 
assumptions can be found in Hoel (1962). 
7 This is an approximation in a world where volatility forecasts are well established and agreed but mean 
forecasts are not; such a situation arises when there is a dominant risk management system or a implied 
volatility methodology that is universally accepted, see Merton (1980) who agrees that means are much 
harder to forecast than variances.  
8 Relaxing this assumption leads to “rational bubbles”. There are however theoretical and empirical 
arguments that can be used to rule out the existence of rational bubbles (see Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay 1997 for a brief discussion). 
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In the world of homogeneous and perfectly rational investors, the price of the risky 
asset should equal its fundamental value, independent of the trading and price history 
of the asset. Changes in the fundamental price can only be caused by exogenous shocks 
on economic fundamentals.  
 
3. Heterogeneous Forecasts 
 
In the asset pricing model with heterogeneous investors, market equilibrium (7) states 
that the price of the risky asset equals the discounted weighted average of 
heterogeneous forecasts on the risky payoff minus the risk premium, with the weights 
being the popularity of different forecasting strategies. In this section, we will discuss 
the risky payoff forecasts by heterogeneous, boundedly rational investors.  
 
The attributes to investors heterogeneity can go beyond the conventional paradigm of 
asymmetric information to include diversity in prior beliefs. Kurz (1997) argues that 
the centre of individuals’ disagreement lies in their diverse prior beliefs instead of 
information asymmetry; diverse beliefs explain why different interpretations arise 
given the same information. On the other hand, prior beliefs also influence information 
selection. Investors with different beliefs are likely to pick up dissimilar sources for 
their forecasts.  
 
We will mainly focus on two classes of investors: fundamentalists and technical traders. 
Fundamentalists believe that the price of the asset should reveal its fundamental value. 
For fundamentalists, the stock price reflects the underlying value of the company and 
its potential for growth. Fundamental analysis thus involves studying the overall 
economy condition as well as the financial condition and management of the company, 
but dismisses market activity as the behaviour of unreliable, emotional herd. In contrast, 
technical analysis involves analysing statistics generated by market activity. Technical 
traders focus on the price and trading histories to seek to identify patterns in price 
movement and to forecast future activity.  
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Denote by iTAtP
,  investor i’s technical forecast on the risky asset price, made at time t, 
and denote by te  some random noise at time t. We make the following assumptions 
about heterogeneous investors’ conditional forecasts on future dividends and prices:  
 
 ddEdE ttt
i
t == ++ ][][ 11 .  (11) 
 t
iTA
t
iFi
t
i
t PPPE ebb ++-=+
,
1 )1(][ .  (12) 
 
(11) is a simplified assumption about the conditional mean dividend. Investors are 
assumed to share the same information and beliefs about the dividend payments so that 
they have a common conditional expectation on future dividends. For a stochastic IID 
dividend process, this implies that the conditional mean is the unconditional one.  
 
We assume the fundamental value FP of the risky asset is common knowledge. 
Technical traders however believe that short term prices will deviate from the 
fundamental value. (12) expresses the conditional expectation on the risky asset price 
as a weighted sum of the fundamental price and technical forecast, plus some random 
noise assumed to be common for all investors. The noise te  is to capture the effect of 
all other sources that may influence the price forecast. The weight ib  reveals the 
investor type. ib-1  and ib  are investor i’s forecasting weights on the fundamental 
price and technical forecast respectively.  
 
We will consider fundamentalists to be using only fundamental analysis ( 0=ib ) and 
technical traders to be using only technical analysis ( 1=ib ), although the mixture of 
both analyses is possible.  
 
Assumptions (11) and (12) are consistent with the asset pricing model discussed in the 
previous section. The consistency can be seen in the following illustration: if all 
investors are fundamentalists, assumptions (11) and (12) should lead to the equilibrium 
price being the fundamental price.  
  
When all investors are fundamentalists, the asset pricing (7), with assumptions (11) and 
(12), can be rewritten as  
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Substituting out FP  in (13) using the formula given by (10), we obtain the equilibrium 
price as 
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The equilibrium price (14) is in fact the fundamental price (10) with some noise.  
 
Now we turn to the case when both investor types are present. One aim of this study is 
to investigate the market impact of the popularity of technical analysis. This 
investigation is made possible in a controlled experiment that looks into what outcome 
arises, given exogenously different ratios of technical traders in the market. Therefore, 
the ratio of investors will not be modelled as an time-varying endogenous variable. As 
shown later, the investor ratio is in fact part of the control variable in the price dynamic 
system. We thus drop the time subscript, and denote by q  and q-1  the fractions of 
technical traders and fundamentalists in the market. With assumptions (11) and (12), 
the asset pricing (7) now becomes 
 ( ) t
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where 1N  is the number of technical traders. Define å == 1 ,1
N
TAi
iTA
t
iTA
t PP qq
 as the 
average technical forecast among technical traders, made at time t, on the price of the 
risky asset. Substituting out the third term on the right hand side of (15) using the 
formula given by (10), we rearrange (15) to obtain 
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-= 1 .  (16) 
  
Therefore, in the presence of both fundamentalists and technical traders, the 
equilibrium price is a weighted combination of the fundamental price and the average 
technical forecast, plus some random noise. The weights depend on the fractions of 
different investors, which indeed represent the popularity of different forecasting 
strategies. In the next section, we will discuss the formation of the average technical 
forecast on the price of the risky asset.  
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4. The Feedback Function  
 
Although technical analysis can take many different forms, all of them share a common 
feature: the use of price history. Investors take positions in the market based on their 
forecasts. The forecasts by technical traders however come from the analysis of price 
history. Thus, through trading, price history is partially incorporated into the new price 
to give a “feedback”. We shall refer to TAtP , the average technical forecast on the price 
of the risky asset, as the feedback function. A nonlinear feedback function gives rise to 
nonlinear price dynamics.  
 
We propose that the feedback function satisfies the following properties:   
(i) It is a function of past prices. More precisely, it is a function of a trend 
indicator, which is a function of past prices.  
(ii) In order to be self-consistent, the feedback function is considered to be 
either monotonically increasing or decreasing in its trend indicator.  
(iii) Since the feedback function represents the average of collective technical 
forecasts, we assumed that it is bounded between two real numbers.    
(iv) When the trend indicator is neutral, the feedback function is assumed to 
become the fundamental price. That is, when past prices provide no 
information on future price movement, the average predicted asset value by 
technical traders coincides with the asset’s fundamental value.  
 
There is virtually no information available to empirically estimate the feedback 
function. Properties (ii) and (iii) make any cumulative distribution function9 (CDF) a 
good choice for the feedback function without loss of generality. First, let 
( )MtttPt PPPf ---= ...,,, 21t  denote the trend indicator at time t; it is a function of past 
prices of M lags. We define the feedback function by  
 
)0(
)(
CDF
CDF
PP
P
tFTA
t
th
= ,  (17) 
                                               
9 Alternatively, see Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) who assume linear feedback to estimate the demand 
functions of technical traders.  
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where h  is the sensitivity parameter to the trend indicator. A large size of h  means, in 
average, technical traders being more responsive to the trend signal. A positive 
(negative) h  leads to the feedback function monotonically increasing (decreasing) in 
its trend indicator. When 0>h , the trend chasing strategy dominates, and when 0<h , 
the contrarian strategy that “buys low and sells high” prevails. In either case, the 
feedback function is bounded between ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
)0(
,0
CDF
PF . If the probability density 
function (PDF) is symmetric, the bound is simply )2,0( FP .   
 
The definition of the feedback function given by (17) is consistent with the asset 
pricing model. When historical prices provide no information (for example, when 
prices are in steady state) and the trend indicator is neutral, i.e. 0=Ptt , it is clear that 
the feedback function (17) becomes only the fundamental price. In this case, it is 
straightforward to show that the equilibrium price (16) will coincide with the one when 
all investors are fundamentalists.  
 
We now rewrite the equilibrium price (16) using the feedback function given by (17) as 
 
 t
P
tt bCDFbbP eth 210 )( ++= ,  (18) 
 where F
f
P
R
b ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-= q10 , )0(1 CDF
P
R
b
F
f
q= , and 
fR
b 12 = .  
   
We will mainly focus on the deterministic dynamics10 free from the stochastic noise te . 
For convenience, let  
 )(
1
0 P
t
t
t CDFb
bP
q th=
-
= .  (19) 
 
tq  is bounded between )1,0( . We shall call tq  the normalised price at time t.   
 
Let ( )Mtttqt qqqf ---= ...,,, 21t  denote the trend indicator at time t of past normalised 
                                               
10 The stochastic noise can disguise the detection of a particular structure in a dynamic system. With the 
stochastic noise above a certain level, any dynamic system would behave like a purely stochastic process 
no matter what the deterministic component is.  
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prices. In order to express tq  in terms of 
q
tt , we make an additional assumption on 
P
tt  
that it is a linear function of price differences. Based on the relationship between tP  
and tq  given by (19), this assumption implies 
q
t
P
t b tt 1= . Now we can rewrite the 
normalised price as  
 )( qtt CDFq tm= ,  (20) 
where 
)0(1 CDF
P
R
b
F
f
qhhm == . The parameter m  essentially reflects the influence of 
feedback trading on prices. The size of m  decreases with fR : an increase in the 
riskfree rate of return will divert risky investments into bonds and reduce feedback 
trading on the risky stock. FP  as a factor in m  is simply due to the design of the 
feedback function (17).  
 
The two crucial terms, h  and q , represent different aspects of feedback trading. As 
discussed before, h  measures the average responsiveness among technical traders to 
the trend signal, and the sign of h  indicates whether the trend chasing strategy or the 
contrarian strategy prevails; q  is the popularity of technical analysis. Therefore, the 
size of m  increases with the size of the feedback effect, holding all other variables in 
m  constant. Besides, the sign of m  indicates a positive or negative feedback. As 
shown later, m  is in fact the control variable that determines the price dynamics.  
 
5. Price Dynamics  
 
The use of the normalised price simplifies the analysis of price dynamics. The 
normalised price given by (20) is indeed a difference equation of order M. The 
dynamics has a simple steady-state solution. In steady state, because the (normalised) 
prices provide no information, i.e. 0=qtt , we will have )0(* CDFq = . For a symmetric 
PDF, the steady-state normalised price is simply 
2
1* =q . The steady-state price is the 
fundamental price as discussed before.  
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For the dynamic analysis, the M-th order difference equation (20) is transformed into a 
first order difference equation using vectors:  
 
 )(f 1-= tt QQ , where )',,,( 11 +--= Mtttt qqqQ L .  (21) 
 
We provide in Appendix 1 some necessary background knowledge for the analysis of a 
dynamic system. It is given on three subject matters relating to first, the definitions of 
Lyapunov (weak) and asymptotic (strong) stability, second, the stability conditions of a 
non-linear dynamic system in terms of eigenvalues, and third, the types of bifurcation 
and bifurcation analysis.  
 
We now calculate the Jacobian matrix for the difference equation (21). The Jacobian 
matrix is an MM ´  matrix given by  
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Let l  denote the eigenvalues. The characteristic equation is given in the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition: The characteristic equation for the Jacobian matrix (22), using the 
normalised price defined by (20), is given by  
 
 0=gl ,  (23) 
 where ( ) )1(11 1,,...,, +´-= MMM llll , and 
1)1(
1
)0(
1
´+*
- ÷
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
ç
è
æ
¶
¶
-=
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t
q
t
Q
PDF
t
mg .  
Proof: See Appendix 2.  
 
To solve the characteristic equation, we proceed with an arbitrary choice of the CDF 
and the trend indicator function defined by the common moving average trading rule.  
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Corollary: Choose the CDF to be the logistic function, and define the trend indicator 
function by11 å
=
-- -=
M
j
jtt
q
t qM
q
1
1
1t . Then the coefficient vector in the characteristic 
equation (23) becomes  
 ),...,,,1( 21 ¢= Mgggg , where 
ï
î
ï
í
ì
=
=
-
-
=
.,...,2,
1
4
;1,
1
4
Mkfor
M
kfor
M
M
k m
m
g  (24) 
Proof: See Appendix 3.   
 
We start our analysis with the simple case 2=M . The characteristic equation is now 
0
88
2 =+-
m
l
m
l , and the eigenvalues are ( )32
16
1
16
-±= mm
m
l .  
 
Price dynamics depends on the parameter m . The difference equation (21) can be 
viewed as ),(f 1 m-= tt QQ , and m  is the control parameter. That is, price dynamics 
changes with m , and m  defines stability. As discussed before, an increase in the size of 
m  can be caused by either a higher ratio of technical traders, or traders being more 
responsive to trend signals. The size of m  reflects the size of the feedback effect, and 
the sign of m  indicates a positive or negative feedback. Figure 1 plots the eigenvalue 
trajectory in the complex plane with respect to m , in the case of 2=M . This plot is 
useful for the analysis of stability and bifurcation.  
 
                                               
11 This is equivalent to defining å
=
-- -=
M
j
jtt
P
t PM
P
1
1
1t . As discussed before, based on (19), the 
relationship between Ptt  and 
q
tt  is given by 
q
t
P
t b tt 1= . From here, it is not difficult to see the two 
definitions are equivalent.  
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In addition to the theoretical analysis, we simulate price time series for different values 
of m  to see how prices reach their fundamental value and how they behave when out of 
equilibrium. The simulation is carried out using (20), with the logistic CDF and the 
trend indicator defined by the moving average rule, as discussed in Corollary. Based on 
the simulation results, phase diagrams are drawn on two-dimensional tq  against 1-tq . 
The sets of Figure 2 to 5 show the results for varying lengths of M. We simulate 6000 
trading periods in total. In order to see how prices evolve, the first 2000 points are 
shown in red, the next 2000 in green, and the last 2000 in blue.  
 
Asymptotic stability, as discussed in Appendix 1, implies an attracting fixed point. It 
requires all eigenvalues lie strictly inside the unit circle. In the case of 2=M , if the 
feedback effect is sufficiently small, i.e. 84 <<- m , then the asymptotic stability 
condition holds, and tq  converges to the steady-state equilibrium *q  as shown by 
Figure 2b, or equivalently, prices tP  asymptotically approach the asset’s fundamental 
value FP .   
 
Even in the simplest case 2=M , different bifurcation routes occur depending on m . 
Suppose m  is initially in the region of (-4, 8), where prices asymptotically converge to 
FP . Consider now there is a significant negative feedback effect. When m  reaches the 
critical bifurcation point 4-=*-m , one eigenvalue will just cross the boundary of 
stability at –1. At this point, the fundamental equilibrium is destabilised by a periodic 
doubling bifurcation, and a period-two orbit is created. Thus, in the presence of a large 
lReal
2=l1-=l
8=m
32=m4-=m f
i
2
3
2
1 +=l
i
2
3
2
1 -=l
lImaginary
 
Figure 1. The eigenvalue trajectory with respect to m  in the case of 2=M . 
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negative feedback, prices start to hop around between two non-fundamental points, as 
shown by Figure 2a. As m  further decreases 4-<m , the system has one eigenvalue 
outside and one inside the unit circle. Pulled by an unstable and a stable manifold, the 
fundamental equilibrium becomes an unstable saddle point coexisting with the 
period-two orbit.  
 
What happens when there exists a large positive feedback? When m  reaches the 
bifurcation point 8=*+m , the pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues pierces the unit 
circle. The fundamental equilibrium undergoes a Hopf bifurcation and loses its stability. 
The bifurcation yields a quasiperiodic orbit that behaves like an invariant curve, points 
on which hop around in circles. The angular frequency is determined by the angle at 
which the eigenvalue passes through the unit circle. In this case, the eigenvalues are 
2
31 i±=l , so the angular frequency is 
3
p . The dynamics is described by a period-six 
cyclic motion, )
3
sin()
3
cos(
t
B
t
A
pp + , as shown by Figure 2c. As the feedback effect 
amplifies 8>m , centred at the repelling fundamental equilibrium, the size of cyclic 
motion expands and prices wonder further way. However, the phase diagram does not 
pursue an unlimited expansion as the feedback function is assumed to be bounded.  
 
So far the analysis has focused on the simple case 2=M . For a longer M, direct 
computation of the stability condition however requires tedious work. We thus plots in 
Appendix 4 the absolute eigenvalues against m  to obtain the stability condition and the 
critical bifurcation points for different lengths of M. For instance, when 7=M , the 
fundamental equilibrium is asymptotically stable if 5.38.5 <<- m .  
 
One might expect a wealth of distinct phase portraits as M gets longer. The simple logic 
is that a longer M increases the order of the characteristic equation and hence the 
number of eigenvalues. Since bifurcation occurs when an eigenvalue crosses the unit 
circle, the system with a longer M is likely to undergo a secondary or even higher-level 
bifurcation. The plots shown in Appendix 4 are however counter-intuitive. The system 
always has only one positive and one negative bifurcation point despite the length of M. 
This implies that the dynamic system with a longer price memory, as shown by the sets 
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of Figure 3 to 5, will have a similar pattern as the system with 2=M . The only 
difference is that a significant positive feedback will now lead the prices to trace out a 
periodic orbit of a higher order than six.   
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Figure 2.a 
 4,4 -== mM  
Figure 3.a 
   
 
 
 
2=M , =m 7.9 
Figure 2.b 
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6. Discussions and Concluding Remarks  
 
In this paper, we study the impact of technical analysis on asset pricing dynamics in a 
simple setting of myopic mean-variance optimising investors. There are two classes of 
investors: fundamentalists, who believe the asset price should reflect its fundamental 
value, and technical traders, who forecast using price history and result in price 
feedback. We discuss the properties of the average technical forecast (the feedback 
function) and formalise it with a plausible mathematical expression.  
 
Our analysis has shown how prices reach the fundamental equilibrium and how a 
significant feedback effect drives prices off the equilibrium path. When the feedback 
effect is sufficiently small, the fundamental equilibrium is asymptotically stable (e.g. 
Figure 4b). When the feedback effect is intensified, two situations arise. On one hand, 
if the contrarian trading strategy prevails, the fundamental equilibrium is destabilised 
by a large negative feedback effect (e.g. Figure 4a). Contrarians trade against trend 
signals. Their long positions often coincide with the neighbourhood of falling prices. 
As a consequence, high demand causes a sharp rebound that diverts the falling prices to 
overshoot the equilibrium path. Similarly, the selling pressure near the mounting prices 
triggers a forceful pullback that again overshoots the fundamental value. The 
fundamental equilibrium is in fact an unstable saddle path. Prices oscillate up and down 
and do not settle on the fundamental equilibrium path.  
 
On the other hand, if the trend chasing strategy prevails, the fundamental equilibrium is 
destabilised by a large positive feedback effect (e.g. Figure 4c). Investors buy into a 
rising market and sell into a falling one. As a consequence, fluctuations off the 
fundamental equilibrium are reinforced by the positive feedback effect, which can even 
lead to bear or bull markets. Instead of frequently overshooting the fundamental 
equilibrium, prices now exhibit a prolonged cycle. This observation may be in common 
with the real world where our economy can sometimes spend long periods away from 
equilibrium and where strategies based on buying past winners are commonplace.  
 
The benchmark market in the absence of technical traders would reach the fundamental 
equilibrium with fluctuations only due to exogenous shocks. In the presence of 
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technical traders, fluctuations off the fundamental equilibrium can be systematically 
and endogenously induced by the feedback effect brought about by technical analysis. 
Our results suggest that non-fundamental multiple equilibria are possible in asset 
pricing. They arise as a result of different degrees of speculation by technical traders. 
Speculation allows possible allocations other than the fundamental value to be reached 
in equilibrium, even though they may not be socially desirable. The finding of multiple 
equilibria is in common with several studies, e.g. Pagano12 (1989).  
 
There is a certain lack of realism about these dynamics. The focus of our model has 
been placed on the impact of technical analysis, but the strategic interaction among 
investors has been ignored. In reality, investors are interdependent and are unlikely to 
remain unchanged. Interaction and adaptation will lead to a change in the ratio of 
different types of investors. The “ecology” of market participants can transform over a 
long horizon through market selection, or it can even change abruptly due to emotional 
herding. Exogenous factors, such as institutional changes, can also have a significant 
impulse on market ecology. Modelling the population ratio as a system variable helps 
answer how the feedback effect varies over time in the present study, and is certainly an 
interesting topic that deserves further exploration.  
                                               
12 Pagano (1989) finds the existence of multiple equilibria as a result of an increasing trade volume; the 
idea is in line with that speculation enlarges the trading space and allows multiple equilibria. However, 
his study, with a different focus from the present study, identify that a large trade volume implies a less 
volatile market which is socially desirable.  
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Appendix 1 
 
There are two types of stability, Lyapunov (weak) stability and asymptotic (strong) 
stability. Their definitions are given as follows.  
 
Definition A1: The fixed point (equilibrium point) *Q  is said to be Lyapunov stable if 
for any 0>e  there exists a neighbourhood )( *W Q of *Q such that for all )( *WÎ QQ , 
the iterates of Q  satisfy 
e<- *QQ)(tf  for iterations 0³t .  
 
Or alternatively, the fixed point *Q  is Lyapunov stable, if for any 0>e  there exists a 
d = 0),( >ed s  such that  
 
if d<- *QQs , then e<-
*QQt  for all st ³ .  
 
Definition A2: The fixed point *Q  is asymptotically stable if  
 (i) it is Lyapunov stable and 
 (ii) *
¥®
= QQ)( lim t
t
f  for all )( *WÎ QQ .  
 
The difference between Lyapunov stability and asymptotic stability is that Lyapunov 
stability only requires a trajectory that starts in a neighbourhood of the fixed point to 
remain close to the fixed point. Asymptotic stability further requires a convergence of 
the trajectory to the fixed point. A fixed point that is only Lyapunov stable but not 
asymptotic stable is called marginally stable. In the present study, we only consider 
asymptotic stability which implies an attracting fixed point.  
 
In applications, it is useful to characterise stability conditions in terms of eigenvalues.  
 
Proposition A1: Consider a discrete linear map 1-= tt AQQ , where A is non-singular. 
The fixed point *Q  is asymptotically stable if and only if all the eigenvalues of A lie 
strictly inside the complex unit circle. For completeness, *Q  is asymptotically unstable 
  
  22
if it is not asymptotically stable. If one eigenvalue lies outside and one inside the unit 
circle, *Q  is a saddle point. The proof can be found in Hale and Kocak (1991, p.73) for 
example.  
 
For a nonlinear dynamic system, the theorem developed independently by Hartman in 
1964 and Grobman in 1965 is helpful.  
 
Theorem A1: The behaviour of a discrete dynamic system )( 1-= tt QQ f  in the vicinity 
of an equilibrium point *Q  is topologically equivalent to the behaviour of the linear 
system 1)( -
*¢= tt QQQ f , provided 1)(f ¹¢
*Q . The proof of the Hartman- Grobman 
linearisation theorem for discrete maps can be found in Robinson (1999, Theorem 6.2).  
 
This theorem basically states that, in discrete nonlinear dynamics, the behaviour of its 
linearisation mimics the true behaviour, provided that the eigenvalues do not lie on the 
unit circle. Proposition A2 hence follows.  
 
Proposition A2: For a discrete nonlinear dynamic system )( 1-= tt QQ f , the behaviour 
of its fixed point *Q is determined by the eigenvalues l  of its linearisation (Jacobian) 
matrix )( *¢ Qf  as follows  
(i) If all 1<l , then *Q  is an attracting equilibrium, or asymptotically stable.  
(ii) If all 1>l , then *Q  is a repelling equilibrium, or asymptotically unstable.  
(iii) If one 1>l  and one 1<l , then *Q  is an unstable saddle. 
(iv) If any 1=l , then a bifurcation takes place.  
 
A change in stability is called bifurcation. There are different types of bifurcation. 
Lemma A1, A2, and A3 give three typical types of bifurcation. The details and the 
proofs can be found in Robinson (1999, Theorem 1.1, 3.1, and 5.1). Alternatively, see 
Kuznetsov (1995) for a comprehensive illustration.  
 
Lemma A1: A transcritical bifurcation takes place when an eigenvalue crosses the 
boundary of stability at +1, i.e. 1=l . A transcritical bifurcation causes a swap of the 
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stability of two equilibria. Suppose there exists two fixed points, one stable and one 
unstable, before a bifurcation takes place. When the dynamic system undergoes a 
transcritical bifurcation, the two equilibria exchange their stability properties.  
 
Lemma A2: A periodic doubling bifurcation occurs when an eigenvalue crosses the 
boundary of stability at –1, i.e. 1-=l . The stable equilibrium  *Q  looses its stability 
and a period-two orbit emerges. Note that this type of bifurcation is absent in a 
continuous-time system.  
 
Lemma A3: When a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues crosses the boundary of 
stability, the dynamic system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation. The stable equilibrium  *Q  
looses its stability and a limit cycle (or a quasi-periodic orbit) bifurcates. The angular 
frequency is given by the angle at which the eigenvalue crosses the unit circle in the 
complex plane.  
 
lIm
lRe
1=l
 
lIm
lRe
1=l
 
lIm
lRe
1-=l
 
Transcritical bifurcation Hopf bifurcation 
 
Periodic doubling 
bifurcation 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Proof of Proposition  
 
The characteristic equation for the Jacobian matrix (22) is given by 
 
 01
2
2
1
1 =+++++ -
--
MM
MMM glglglgl L ,   
 where 
*1
1
qt
t
q
q
-¶
¶
-=g , 
*2
2
qt
t
q
q
-¶
¶
-=g , … , 
*qMt
t
M q
q
-¶
¶
-=g .  
 
The proof of a similar problem can be found in Hamilton (1994, p. 21). 
 
Now, we rewrite the characteristic equation using vectors:  
 
 0=gl ,   
 where ( ) )1(11 1,,...,, +´-= MMM llll , and 
1)1(
1
1
´+*
- ÷
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
ç
è
æ
¶
¶
-=
MQ
t
t
Q
qg .  
 
Using the normalised price given by (20), the 1´M  sub-vector in g  becomes 
 
  
*1*1*1*1
)0()(
)(
Qt
q
t
Qt
q
tq
t
Qt
q
t
Qt
t
Q
PDF
Q
PDF
Q
CDF
Q
q
---- ¶
¶
-=
¶
¶
-=
¶
¶
-=
¶
¶
-
t
m
t
tmm
tm
.    
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Proof of Corollary  
 
Following the proposition, we calculate the coefficient vector in the characteristic 
equation, using the CDF as the logistic function and the trend indicator function defined 
by å
=
-- -=
M
j
jtt
q
t qM
q
1
1
1t .   
 
It is easy to obtain the following derivatives.  
 
M
M
q
qt
q
t 1
*1
-=¶
¶
-
t , and 
Mq
qkt
q
t 1
*
-=¶
¶
-
t , .,...,2for Mk =  
 
The logistic CDF and the PDF are given by  
 
 
)exp(1
)exp(
)(
x
x
xCDF
m
mm
+
= . 
  
 
[ ]
( )2)exp(1
)exp(
)(1)()(
x
x
xCDFxCDFxPDF
m
mmmm
+
=-=
. 
Thus, 
4
1)0( =PDF .   
 
Therefore, we can obtain the coefficients of the characteristic equation (23) as 
M
M
q
PDF
qt
q
t 1
4
)0(
*1
1
--=
¶
¶
-=
-
mtmg , and 
Mq
PDF
qkt
q
t
k
1
4
)0(
*
mtmg =
¶
¶
-=
-
, .,...,2for Mk =  
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Appendix 4 
 
 
x-axis: m , the control parameter of the dynamic system.  
y-axis: l , the absolute eigenvalue.  
Since bifurcation takes place when 1=l , the x-axis is shifted up to the point 1=l  for 
convenience. The bifurcation points *m  and also the stability condition of 1<l  can 
then be easily found. The results are produced using Mathematica.  
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